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WHAT WAS WRONG WITH DRED SCOTT, WHAT'S
RIGHT ABOUT BROWNt
ROBERT A. BURT*
No Supreme Court decision has been more consistently reviled than Dred
Scott v. Sandford.' Other decisions have been attacked, even virulently, by
both contemporary and later critics; other decisions have been overruled by
constitutional amendment or by subsequent Court majorities. But of all the
repudiated decisions, Dred Scott carries the deepest stigma.
If a proper criterion for evaluating a judicial decision is its success in
achieving peaceable resolution of a social dispute, Dred Scott was a palpable
failure; indeed, its critics then and now have plausibly claimed that the
decision played a significant role in precipitating the Civil War. 2 If a proper
criterion is its consistency with high ethical values, Dred Scott fails even
more clearly. Chief Justice Taney's opinion for the Court recited the most
explicit racist dogma that appears anywhere, before or since his opinion, in
the pages of the United States Reports. In explaining why no black person,
whether slave or free, could ever become a citizen of the United States,
Taney relied on blacks' historic status "as beings of an inferior or-
der... altogether unfit to associate with the white race...; and so far inferior,
that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect."
'3
Taney did mention the Declaration of Independence whose resounding
proclamation of human equality has been a recurrent source of moral tension
t Copyright 1984, by Robert A. Burt.
* Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
2. See, e.g., R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUIIciAL SuaPRaAcy 327 (1949); D. POTTER,
THE IMPENDING CRISIS 1848-1861, 291-93 (1976); S. KUTLER, THE Dred Scott DECISION: LAW
OR POLITICS Xvii (1967).
3. 60 U.S. at 407.
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for white Americans regarding blacks; but Taney invoked the Declaration
only to assert that "it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race
were not intended to be included. ' 4 His reasoning is almost comical:
[I]f the language, as understood in that day, would embrace [blacks],
the conduct of the distinguished men who framed the Declaration
of Independence would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent
with the principles they asserted; and instead of the sympathy of
mankind, to which they so confidently appealed, they would have
deserved and received universal rebuke and reprobation. Yet the men
who framed this declaration were great men-high in literary ac-
quirements-high in their sense of honor, and incapable of asserting
principles inconsistent with those on which they were acting.5
Thus Taney reads an unambiguous racism into the Declaration of Independ-
ence in order to acquit the Founding Fathers of the immorality of inconsis-
tency.
As a matter of historic fact, the founders were inconsistent, were aware
of their inconsistency and admitted it. 6 Thomas Jefferson, the draftsman of
the Declaration, was explicit in this-and not simply in his private journals
but in his widely circulated book, Notes on Virginia, which he wrote while
Governor of Virginia and published while Minister to France.7 Taney's
account of the framers' state of mind was thus wrong; it was, if you will,
too black and white.
Taney's account was, however, an accurate depiction of a belief about
black status that was widely held and openly avowed among his contempor-
aries. By 1857, when Taney wrote, the conviction of blacks' innate inferiority
and subhuman status had become an article of faith throughout the South.
It was the premise on which the dominant apologists argued that black
slavery was an inevitable, permanent institution and was, moreover, a
"positive good."' Until around 1830 no reputable Southerner had been
prepared to make this kind of public avowal. Before that time when slavery
was publicly justified, it was only as a "necessary evil," always with the
implication that sometime, somehow, the institution would be abolished. 9
There was deep hypocrisy in this stance since no political institution was
working even remotely toward this prospect (though there were occasional
schemes for gradual emancipation and for African colonization that were
4. Id. at 410.
5. Id.
6. B. BAiLYN, TBE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 235.46 (1967);
D.B. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 1770-1823, 273-84 (1975).
7. Referring to slavery, Jefferson wrote:
[Clan the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their only
firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are the gift of
God? That they are not to be violated but with wrath? Indeed, I tremble for my
country when I reflect that God is just: That his justice cannot sleep forever....
T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 163 (1800).
8. G. FREDERICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WroTE MIm 43-90 (1971).
9. W. L. N. ROSE, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM 22-27 (1982).
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privately advanced and even publicly debated in Southern legislatures as late
as 1832).10 But by Taney's time this hypocrisy was ended in the South. And
in the North, though there were active abolitionists demanding an immediate
end to slavery, popular conviction of blacks' innate inferiority was also
widespread." Indeed, de Tocqueville pungently observed in 1835 that eman-
cipated blacks were regarded with greater aversion and subjected to more
overt indignities by Northern whites than black slaves were treated in the
South; everywhere in America, he noted, blacks were "hardly recognized as
sharing the common features of humanity." 
1 2
Thus a plausible case can be made that though Taney misconstrued the
attitudes of the Founding Fathers, and though his views of blacks' status is
morally repugnant today, nonetheless he aptly characterized the dominant
valuation of blacks in his time-and as a matter of national signification,
not simply as a regional spokesman. I want to emphasize this proposition
because I believe that, unless we are prepared to admit its force, we cannot
adequately evaluate what the Supreme Court did in the Dred Scott case. No
matter how fervently we now believe that Dred Scott was wrongly decided,
no matter how firmly the retrospective judgment of history condemns the
decision, this condemnation has no adequate jurisprudential force unless we
can specify how and why Taney and his fellow judges at that time should
have reached a different decision in the case. If there is a constitutional law
jurisprudence worthy of the designation, is must consist of more than inviting
judges to toss dice toward the prospect of historic vindication. We now
condemn Dred Scott; but how precisely should Chief Justice Taney have
known this beforehand, so that he could have shaped his judicial conduct
accordingly?
I do not intend to justify the Dred Scott decision. I believe the case was
wrongly decided but not because it rested on a view of black people that I
find morally repugnant (though it did so rest, and I do so find). The decision
was wrong because it followed from an incorrect view of the judicial role in
our society, a view that itself is morally untenable. But let me be plain. I
am not setting out a hierarchy of immorality by which the degradations
inflicted on blacks in our society become somehow less significant than
judges' errors in comprehending their proper constitutional role. I mean only
to suggest for constitutional lawyers that it is more important to identify
standards that can reliably guide the conduct of judges looking toward an
uncertain future than to issue general condemnations of the racist attitudes
prevalent among earlier judges and the society of which they were part. Put
another way, I am content to say that no future judge should act on the
racist premises that Taney embraced. But his principle alone is insufficient
10. R. McCoLLEY, SLAVERY AND JEFFERSONIAN ViRGnA 114-140 (2d ed. 1973); see L.
BAYER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE iN LAW 723-24 (1974) (describing Virginia legislative debate in
1832).
11. L. LrrwACK, NORTH OF SLAERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES 1790-1860, 15-29,
223-230 (1961); E. FOHER, FREE Soxa, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUB-
LICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CviL WAR 261-300 (1970).
12. A. DETocQuEvLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AmRCA 314 (J. Mayer & M. Lerner, eds., 1966).
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to form a satisfactory guide for future judicial conduct by indicating what
precisely was wrong in the Supreme Court's decision in the Dred Scott case.
To attain this, it is first necessary to explore the Court's decision in
some detail-in effect, to build the strongest possible case for it. If, for this
purpose, we step back from instinctive revulsion at the Court's effort to
uphold black slavery, I believe we will see how comfortably the Court's
opinion satisfies widely held current-day norms of constitutional interpreta-
tion, both in application of substantive doctrine and in judicial role concep-
tions. But-I repeat-I mean to bury Dred Scott, not to praise it. When we
have seen how readily the decision fits contemporary jurisprudential stand-
ards, then we will also see how (and how extensively) these standards must
be reworked in order to carry out a successful interment.
I.
In 1834, John Emerson, a United States Army surgeon, was transferred
from Missouri to Illinois.' 3 He took along his slave, Dred Scott, notwith-
standing that Illinois law prohibited slavery. Two years later Emerson was
again transferred into what was then the Wisconsin Territory (and is now
the state of Minnesota); Emerson again took Scott, though by the Missouri
Compromise of 1820, Congress had forbidden slavery there. After several
years Emerson sent Scott back to Missouri, a slave state. In 1846, Scott
brought suit in a Missouri state court against Emerson's widow, claiming
that his residence first in a free state and then in a free territory had effected
his emancipation. Missouri legal precedent firmly supported Scott's conten-
tion and a state jury held for him. Mrs. Emerson appealed, however, and in
1852 the Missouri Supreme Court (by a two-to-one vote) overruled its
precedent and refused to give comity to the Illinois or federal law. The
majority explained their repudiation of precedent thus:
Times are not as they were when the former decisions on this subject
were made. Since then not only individuals but States have been
possessed with a dark and fell spirit in relation to slavery, whose
gratification is sought in the pursuit of measures, whose inevitable
consequence must be the overthrow and destruction of our govern-
ment. Under such circumstances it does not behoove the State of
Missouri to show the least countenance to any measure which might
gratify this spirit.14
The spectre of heightened sectional conflict thus appeared on the very face
of the record in the Dred Scott case.
Scott did not, however, directly appeal this state ruling to the Supreme
Court-an appeal that would almost certainly have been fruitless in light of
its recent decision mandating deference to state court choice of law rulings
in such disputes.15 Scott's attorneys decided instead to initiate, in effect, a
13. The factual background of the Dred Scott case is related in POTTER, supra note 2, at
267-69.
14. Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. Rep. 576, 586 (1852).
15. Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1851).
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new proceeding in federal court. This jurisdictional move had become
plausible because Mrs. Emerson had by then moved from Missouri and had
transformed control of Scott to her brother, John Sanford, who lived in
New York; Scott could thus sue Sanford in federal court under the diversity
of citizenship clause in article III. In 1854 the federal court agreed that it
had jurisdiction because of the parties' diverse citizenship, but ruled on the
merits that Scott was still a slave;' 6 Scott appealed to the Supreme Court.
(One indisputable error committed by the Supreme Court in the case was its
misspelling of Sanford's name in the United States Reports; 7 whatever the
subsequent reception of Dred Scott v. Sandford in our jurisprudence, this
error at least has been habitually repeated.)
If the Supreme Court had been intent on avoiding a broad or novel
ruling in the case, there were many ways to do so. One particularly plausible
route for this purpose would have been to rely on the relationship between
the initial state court ruling and the subsequent federal court proceeding,
and simply to apply the Supreme Court's prior holding requiring deference
to the state court choice of law. This was indeed the initial impulse of a
majority of the Justices; an opinion was prepared by Justice Nelson holding
to this ground.' 8 Ultimately, however, the other Justices abandoned this
narrow ruling; when the case was finally decided on March 6, 1857, Justice
Nelson filed this opinion but only for himself.19 The others reached the
momentous issues for which the case became notorious.
Every Justice on the Court wrote in the case-a fact that itself starkly
symbolized the heightened fractiousness since the days when John Marshall
had been regularly able to muster unanimity at least among his biethren if
not in the country at large. Chief Justice Taney's opinion was styled the
opinion of the Court though he spoke for a clear majority of six Justices
only in holding (over two dissents) that Congress lacked constitutional
authority to enact the Missouri Compromise of 1820 prohibiting slavery in
the territories. 20 Taney also ruled that Scott could not sue in federal court
because blacks, whether slave or free, were not citizens under the Constitu-
tion. Only four other Justices addressed this issue, two concurring with
Taney and two dissenting; thus on this ground the Court's vote was three to
two. 2' Nonetheless, Taney's opinion was popularly viewed as dispositive on
the questions both of Scott's citizenship and of the constitutionality of the
Missouri Compromise, and it is his opinion that most rewards close scrutiny.
First, the citizenship question. Historians examining the precedents have
concluded" that Taney was wrong and that Justice Curtis's dissent was an
16. See 60 U.S. at 400-01.
17. KUTLER, supra note 2, at xi n.3.
18. POTTER, supra note 2, at 272-73.
19. 60 U.S. at 457.
20. The six Justices in the majority were Taney, Wayne, Daniel, Grier, Catron and
Campbell; the dissenters were McLean and Curtis. See the careful tally set out by George
Ticknor Curtis, Justice Curtis' younger brother, reprinted in KuTnER, supra note 2, at 101-03.
21. The three were Taney, Wayne and Daniel, with McLean and Curtis dissenting.
22. POTTER, supra note 2, at 275; D. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW, AND PoLITIcs: THE
Dred Scott CAsE iN HisTORicAL PERSPECTIVE 191-99 (1981).
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accurate and devastating rebuttal of Taney's claim that blacks generally were
excluded from citizenship when the Constitution was framed.22 The historical
record is indeed clear that blacks had then been fully enfranchised citizens
in some Northern states. But this rebuttal misses the central thrust of Taney's
argument-an argument that he tried to buttress with a patently erroneous
historical gloss (a shoddy rhetorical technique that he was neither the first
nor the last Supreme Court Justice to invoke).23 Taney's central point was
that, notwithstanding the apparent assumption in the Constitution that state
and federal citizenship were the same, there was nonetheless a difference
between the two statuses, and that state citizenship did not necessarily carry
federal citizenship with it. Taney's explicit concern was that if state and
federal citizenship were unitary, then a Northern state's action in giving
citizenship to a black person would override legislative restrictions that
Southern states had imposed on all blacks coming within their territorial
jurisdiction. Thus, Taney observed, how could a Southern state enforce its
laws against public speech or assembly by all blacks, slave or free, if Northern
blacks could freely enter the South cloaked in the constitutional protection
of federal citizenship?
24
This argument presupposed that the Constitution directly vested in
individuals, as citizens of the United States, specific rights against the states.
The Supreme Court had not previously held this. The Court had ruled in
1833 that the Bill of Rights only restricted Congress, not the states;25 but
there was prior support, most notably in an 1823 circuit opinion by Justice
Washington, for Taney's premise that the privileges and immunities clause
in article IV, section 2, created federal citizenship rights that could be
asserted against states.
26
The fourteenth amendment did not overrule Taney's opinion on this
score. The first sentence of section 1 did reject Taney's claim that blacks
were not citizens of the United States; but the second sentence endorsed his
premise that this citizenship as such implied fundamental rights for individ-
uals, specific "privileges and immunities of citizens of the United State,"
that could be enforced against states. 27 The sponsors of the amendment did
not credit Taney for this premise, though they repeatedly asserted in the
congressional debates that they were not creating a novel constitutional
doctrine in this provision but were instead simply reiterating Justice Wash-
ington's earlier construction of the privileges and immunities clause in article
IV.28
This continuity in constitutional interpretation between Taney and the
framers of the fourteenth amendment indicates that Taney's construction of
23. See Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 122
(criticizing "law-office" history in Supreme Court opinions).
24. 60 U.S. at 422-25.
25. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
26. Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. CC., Fed. Case No. 3,230 (Cir. Ct. E.D. Pa. 1823).
27. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
28. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Senator Howard);
id. at 1034, 2642 (statement of Representative Bingham); see also Burt, Miranda and Title II:
A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT. REv. 81, 85-86, 90-91.
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federal citizenship rights would not appear fanciful to his contemporaries
and, because it was not fanciful, this construction could threaten precisely
the Southern laws that Taney identified in his opinion-if, that is, blacks
were considered citizens of the United States for purposes of article IV.
Of course this construction of article IV was not directly at stake in
Dred Scott; the immediate question was whether Scott and Sanford were
"Citizens of different States" for purposes of article III federal court
jurisdiction. Taney could have held that blacks were citizens for this purpose
without necessarily foreclosing a later, different construction of federal
citizenship under article IV. Taney was not, however, writing a narrow
opinion in Dred Scott. for this purpose Justice Nelson's opinion would have
sufficed: but not for Taney; not for five other Justices; not in 1857. Taney
and his concurring brethren were writing to save the Union from the "dark
and fell spirit in relation to slavery" that palpably threatened, as the Missouri
Supreme Court had put it, "the overthrow and destruction of our govern-
ment." 29 Taney meant to reassure the South that its continued adherence to
the Union would not mean that it was disabled from protecting its institution
of slavery.30
Whatever the historic inaccuracies of Taney's claim that blacks were not
considered citizens when the Constitution was written, he was on solid
ground in claiming that the framers did not expect the Constitution to
interfere with Southern states' formal authority or practical capacity to
protect slavery." The framers did not clearly anticipate the draconian meas-
ures that the South would later find necessary. The predominant view in
1787, among most of the delegates (South and North) at the Constitutional
Convention, was that state policies toward slavery were becoming less
restrictive; generous manumission statutes were becoming the norm through-
out the South and hope seemed at least plausible for complete emancipation
at some distant time, perhaps assisted by a national prohibition of slave
importation that would fall within Congress's powers after 1808.32
This benign expectation proved false. Beginning in the 1820s and gath-
ering force thereafter-partly in response to increased stridency among
Northern abolitionists after 1830-Southern states enacted the prohibitions
on speech and assembly that Taney cited as well as rigid restrictions on
manumission and laws virtually forcing free blacks to leave the South.33 Well
29. Emerson, 15 Mo. Rep. at 586.
30. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 287-88 (Taney's wish to reassure South).
31. D. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRucTuR OF AmucAN PoLrrlcs 207-47 (1979 ed.).
32. See NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES
MADISON 503-05 (1969 ed., Norton Library) (remarks of various delegates to the Constitutional
Convention) (hereinafter cited as NOTES OF DEBATES). In his NOTES ON TnE STATE OF VIRGINIA,
Jefferson had observed:
I think a change already perceptible, since the origin of the present revolution. The
spirit of the master is abating, that of the slave rising from the dust, his condition
mollifying, the way I hope preparing ... for a total emancipation ... with the consent
of the masters....
JEFFERSON, supra note 7, at 163; see also ROBINSON, supra note 31, at 225-28.
33. E. FONER, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR 40-42 (1980); ROSE,
supra note 9, at 26-27.
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before 1857, the South was racked by conjunctive fears of slave revolts,
Northern abolitionist assault, and increasing electoral vulnerability in na-
tional political institutionsY4 The context of sectional relations had dramat-
ically changed between 1787 and 1857.
Thus, when Taney set out to interpret the word "citizen" in the
constitutional document, it was not at all implausible for him to conclude
that the framers in 1787 had not asked themselves whether blacks would be
included in that word-and certainly had not asked with regard to the
unanticipated context of 1857. Given the care the framers took generally in
the Constitution to protect Southern slavery from any potentially hostile
exercise of national power, it was more than plausible to conclude, as Taney
did, that the framers would have withheld federal citizenship from all blacks
if the consequence of that bestowal would be to invalidate laws the South
viewed as necessary to the preservation of black slavery. Justice Curtis's
dissenting argument, based on the state citizenship status of blacks in 1787,
was a mechanistic use of history without an adequate appreciation for full
context which can make old words truly intelligible to new readers.
Taney's second major argument in his opinion, that Congress had no
constitutional authority to prohibit slavery in the territories, was more
vulnerable to historical refutation. Unlike the black citizenship question,
successive Congresses from the first days of the Republic had construed the
Constitution to provide precisely the authority that Taney denied. Indeed,
the Continental Congress, acting under the Articles of Confederation, had
banned slavery from the Northwest Territory in 1787, at the very moment
when the Constitution was being drafted in Philadelphia;35 and congressional
authority for this action was repeatedly affirmed, from the reenactment of
the Northwest Ordinance by the first Congress in 1789.36 Thus it is difficult,
as a matter of historical exegesis, to exclude authority to ban territorial
slavery from the words of article IV, section 3: "The Congress shall have
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.... -37
Nonetheless, Taney struggled forward. His argument had three steps.
The first seems strained almost to the point of silliness: that the general
language of article IV was intended only to apply to territories actually or
imminently belonging to the federal government when the Constitution was
ratified and not to any later-acquired property.38 Taney could cite no
contemporary witness among the draftsmen or ratifying conventions for this
penurious construction; his only support is the semantic difference between
the congressional authority given by article I, section 8, to "exercise exclusive
Legislation in all Cases whatsoever" for the District of Columbia as the seat
34. POTTER, supra note 2, at 451-55; Davis, The Emergence of Immediatism in British
and American Antislavery Thought, in ANTEBELLUM REFORM 150-51 (D.B. Davis, ed., 1967).
35. ROBINSON, supra note 31, at 378-82; see S. LYND, CLASS CONFLICT, SLAVERY AND THE
UNITED STATES CONSTrruTIoN 185-213 (1967) (slavery prohibition in 1787 Ordinance part of
compromise with South in framing Constitution).
36. POTTER, supra note 2, at 54-55.
37. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
38. 60 U.S. at 436.
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of government, and the supposedly less expansive power for the Territories,
to "make all needful Rules and Regulations." 3 9
This semantic argument was only the first step, however. Taney's second
step is more interesting. He argued that congressional authority regarding
territorial slavery must be limited because Congress was not authorized to
create permanent "colonies.. .to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure;"
the Constitution instead intended that all territories would ultimately become
states, and all new states must enter the Union "upon an equal footing with
the other States." 4 This meant for Taney that each new state must have
unrestricted authority, as the old states had, to decide for itself whether to
accept or prohibit slavery within its jurisdiction. But here Taney saw a
dilemma. If Congress could forbid territorial slavery, then the die would be
irrevocably cast for the new state ultimately arising from that territory; no
one holding slaves would have settled there, all the settlers would have a
vested interest in excluding slave labor, and they would move at once to
embed this policy in the new state constitution or laws.41 Thus, Taney
reasoned, in order to ensure that new states would be free to decide the
slavery issue for themselves, Congress must be barred from deciding the
issue for the territories.
This is the underlying rationale that justified for Taney his strained
construction of the congressional power in article IV to "make all needful
rules and regulations" for the territories. He was arguing, in effect, that the
question whether new states would permit or forbid slavery had assumed
such overwhelming significance for the nation that the question could not
be controlled by these spare words of article IV, written in a different era
when the draftsmen could not see how the entire success of their nationalizing
enterprise might hinge on the interpretation of these words. Taney thus
restricted the application of these words to the special circumstances regard-
ing territorial slavery as the draftsmen would have known them in 1787-
restricted them, as he put it, to "a known and particular Territory, and to
meet a present emergency" that the framers had directly before them.
42 If
Taney's verbal gyrations to this end seem unconvincing, his underlying
conception of his interpretative enterprise seems nonetheless in the spirit of
his immediate predecessor's much-cited dictum, "we must never forget that
it is a constitution we are expounding.
'43
There was, however, a further conceptual problem with the underlying
sense of Taney's position; he addressed this problem with the third step of
his argument. The problem was this: Granted that congressional exclusion
of slavery from the territories would ensure that the new states would also
forbid slavery, nonetheless permitting territorial slavery was not a neutral
position. Permitting territorial slavery could effectively guarantee that a slave
39. Id. at 440.
40. Id. at 446-47.
41. FONER, supra note 11, at 28.
42. 60 U.S. at 432.
43. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
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state would ultimately emerge; many Northerners at least so believed.44 This
belief was based on a conviction that slave labor had an unfair advantage
over free labor and that the former would inevitably drive out the latter;
admitting any slaves to a territory would thus necessarily exclude free labor
and the territory would become a slave state. This was the ground on which
the politically more potent "free soil" advocates of the North in effect
joined with abolitionists to amass the numerical force that brought Lincoln
to the Presidency.45 The free soil advocates did not oppose slavery where it
had already taken hold but opposed the extension of slavery in the territories
which, so the argument went, would inevitably destroy free labor everywhere.
Taney, in effect, addressed this problem with the third step of his
argument: that if a choice must inevitably be made between giving preference
to the system of free labor or slave labor, then slavery must prevail because
of its specially protected status under the Constitution. As offensive as this
proposition now appears, and as galling as it was to many of Taney's
contemporaries, there was some plausibility to this argument. Taney rested
it on two textual grounds: the fifth amendment, restricting Congress' au-
thority toward deprivations of property, and the fugitive slave clause in
article IV, section 2, recognizing-as Taney put it-"the right of property
of the master in a slave. '" 46 Indeed, Taney continued, the fugitive slave clause
did more than recognize this right; this recognition was "coupled with the
duty of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights" to slave property.
47
Thus did slavery have a specially protected status in the Constitution-a
status which not only barred Congress but, Taney elaborated, also barred
the territorial governments from prohibiting slavery since they had only
derivative powers from Congress.
4
8
This last step in Taney's argument exposes the weakness of all of it; but
that weakness is not so much in the force of his logic or in the coherence
and plausibility of his use of constitutional text. The flaw is in the role that
Taney saw for his Court in resolving the question of constitutional principle
presented by the Dred Scott case. In this last step, holding that the Consti-
tution regarded slaves as property and committed Congress to protect
masters' property rights as such, Taney gave a definitive answer to a question
that the framers did not resolve.
Taney's error was not that the framers gave a different answer so that
the document contradicted him. It was instead that the document contra-
dicted itself on this question. Taney is clearly correct that the fugitive slave
44. FONER, supra note 11, at 55-62.
45. See id. at 103-225 (identifying varying "radical," "moderate" and "conservative"
attitudes toward slavery among Northern electorate that ultimately coalesced in Lincoln's
victory).
46. 60 U.S. at 451.
47. Id. at 452.
48. Id. at 451.
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clause recognized masters' property rights to slaves. And yet the Constitution
nowhere says this explicitly. Indeed, the word "slave" never appears as such
in the document. This omission was not a casual oversight. It was a calculated
choice by the framers. There were many provisions in the Constitution that
dealt with an obviously protected the institution of slavery.49 But the word
was never used because, as James Madison stated in the convention debates,
it would be "wrong to admit in the Constitution the idea that there could
be property in men.
' 50
Taney was thus wrong, though at the same time he was also right, that
the Constitution acknowledged property rights in slaves. As in his initial
discussion of the citizenship status of blacks and the meaning of equality in
the Declaration of Independence, Taney had grabbed hold of an inconsis-
tency, and not a small one-a contradiction at the moral center of the
American enterprise. And, as with the black citizenship issue, Taney opted
for one side of the contradiction to forge an answer to the question that the
framers were not able to answer for themselves.
We cannot deduce from this proposition that the two dissenting Justices
in Dred Scott were correct and that Taney and his majority were wrong,
that the Constitution vested federal citizenship in blacks and authority in
Congress to prohibit territorial slavery. All we can say is that both Taney
and the dissenters were wrong, and that the Constitution properly understood
did not answer the question, at least in the context in which that question
presented itself in 1857. This conclusion does not mean that either Taney or
the dissenters were necessarily wrong in answering this question. This con-
clusion does mean, however, that any answer to the constitutional question
would necessarily be constructed from bits and pieces, from shards of the
vessel. On this score, Taney's interpretive effort seems plausible, coherent,
and even ingenious-certainly when measured against constitutional interpre-
tations proffered by the most highly regarded Supreme Court Justices before
and since.
The jurisprudential fault I find in Taney's Dred Scott decision is not in
the substantive interpretation of the Constitution, not in the answer to the
question posed by the case. The fault I find is in the Court's decision to
answer the question as posed, in its decision to decide. But this decision, we
will see, fits quite comfortably within the currently dominant conception of
the Supreme Court's proper role in our society. And this is what makes it
so truly difficult, in the context of our contemporary norms of constitutional
law, to say precisely what was wrong with Dred Scott.
49. See generally ROBINsoN, supra note 31, at 168-247 (discussing constitutional provisions
regarding slave importation, fugitive slaves and enumeration of slaves for purposes of electoral
representation and taxation).
50. NoTms oF DEBAT.ES, supra note 32, at 532.
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II.
From the moment the Court first spoke in Dred Scott, it was criticized
for addressing the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise. Justice
Curtis, in his dissent, charged that the court had "transcend[ed] the limits
of [its] authority" in reaching this question, because its initial holding that
Dred Scott was not a citizen, and therefore could not sue in federal courts,
had wholly disposed of the case.5' As a technical proposition, however,
Justice Curtis's charge does not hold. Chief Justice Taney clearly articulated
an adequate jurisdictional justification for reaching the Missouri Compromise
question. Having first concluded that no black, slave or free, was a citizen
of the United States for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction, Taney
then set out to show that even if he were wrong in concluding that Scott
lacked citizenship on this ground, there was nonetheless another basis for
holding that Scott lacked citizenship. If Scott were still a slave, Taney said,
then it would be clear that he was not a citizen of Missouri, which he alleged
as the basis for his jurisdictional diversity claim; and if, Taney continued,
the Missouri Compromise forbidding territorial slavery were invalid, then
Scott would have no basis for alleging his freedom; he would still be a slave
and barred from federal court on this ground.
5 2
There are prudential grounds for criticizing Taney's decision to reach
the Missouri Compromise issue, grounds of judicial tact, but the technical
basis for Taney's position is unassailable and Curtis's charge is wrong. Taney
did not go beyond deciding the question that Scott lacked citizenship for
federal court diversity jurisdiction; he simply stated alternative grounds to
reach this same conclusion. Nonetheless, this technical criticism of Dred
Scott quickly attained acceptance as a truism. In 1911 it was effectively
rebutted in a notable article by Edward Corwin;53 but he criticism has
persisted .
4
David Potter has suggested an intriguing explanation for this resistant
technical error by Dred Scott critics. The charge that Taney had violated the
Court's own clear-cut jurisprudential rules was, Potter said, "a psychological
godsend"' '55 to the critics because they could both condemn the Dred Scott
decision, which they detested, and yet affirm the sanctity of the Supreme
Court, which they continued to revere. Potter thus points to the central
irony arising from the Dred Scott decision. Though the Court's decision was
anathema to antislavery forces in the North, and though its contemporaries
(as well as subsequeni observers) believed that the decision played some
significant role in precipitating the Civil War by polarizing the ideological
opposition of North and South, nonetheless the Supreme Court emerged
51. 60 U.S. at 589.
52. Id. at 427.
53. Corwin, The Dred Scott Decision in the Light of Contemporary Legal Doctrines, 17
AM. HIST. Rav. 52 (1911).
54. POTTER, supra note 2, at 283; KUTLER, supra note 2, at xiv.
55. POTTER, supra note 2, at 284.
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form the Civil War with an extraordinary vote of confidence in the addition
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
5 6
By 1868, of course, the Court's personnel had dramatically changed;
Taney had died and Lincoln had appointed five members, a majority of the
Court. Nonetheless it is at least curious that the antislavery Republicans who
had been burnt by Dred Scott, who had been directly subjected to the
politically uncontrollable force of the Court's authority, and who were now
in firm control of the national political institutions-it is a least curious that
these men should frame the most substantial grant of judicial power that
appears anywhere in the Constitution. The fourteenth amendment in effect
ratified the claim of judicial supremacy over Congress and the states in
interpreting the Constitution;57 it provided a more explicit, self-consciously
intended grant of this judicial authority than John Marshall had available
for his patchwork argument in Marbury v. Madison.5 8 This is, then, a
considerable irony (echoed, as we will see later, by the fact that a majority
of the Court that decided Brown v. Board of Education9 in 1954-the most
expansive invocation of judicial authority in our history-had been appointed
by Franklin Roosevelt with an avowed mission to dismantle the regime of
Rule by the Judiciary).
There is a cultural explanation for this irony and for the persistent effort
of Dred Scott critics to condemn the decision while praising the Court as an
institution (to hate the sin but love the sinner, as it were). Dred Scott may
have proven the Supreme Court's unreliability as a wise guide, as a moral
arbiter, for a troubled nation. But the role of guide and arbiter was needed
and there was no other institutional candidate for it. Henry Adams testified
to this imperative in his Education, recalling his own attitude in 1870, little
more than a decade away from the wounds inflicted by Dred Scott:
Although, step by'step, he [Adams] had been driven, like the rest
of the world, to admit that American society had outgrown most of
56. The House Committee's initial draft of the fourteenth amendment provided a direct
grant of authority only to Congress to "make laws" securing "equal protection" and other
guarantees against hostile state legislation; this draft was found unacceptable because of fears
about the political complexion of future Congresses. See Burt, supra note 28, at 92-93. The
amendment was changed to its present form to assure that the judiciary would protect its
purposes against future Congresses. See id.
57. While the history of judicial review properly goes back to Marbury v. Madison,
and beyond, the Court's performance from 1864 to 1873 marked a significant
deviation. The sheer volume alone is different. But more important was the political
and public acceptance of this judicial function as a standard for measlring the
legitimacy of power. Marbury v. Madison and Dred Scott occasioned bitter disagree-
ments over the role of the judiciary. But while dissatisfaction occasionally existed
with the results of the Chase Court's decisions, there were few who called into
question the idea of exercising this judicial role.
S. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS 125 (1968) (emphasis in original).
58. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
59. 347 U.S. 483 (19754).
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its institutions, he still clung to the Supreme Court, much as a
churchman clings to his bishops, because they are his only symbol
of unity; his last rag of Right. 60
This clinging faith was the imperative that led the Supreme Court in
1857 to decide the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise. On the
Court itself, Justice Wayne gave most direct voice to this faith in his brief
concurring opinion:
[T]he Court neither sought nor made [this] case.... [W]e have only
discharged our duty.. .as the framers of the Constitution meant the
judiciary to [do].... The case involves private rights of value, and
constitutional principles of the highest importance, about which there
had become such a difference of opinion, that the peace and harmony
of the country required the settlement of them by judicial decision.6'
Wayne thus clearly revealed his underlying assumption that an authoritative
proclamation by the Supreme Court would effectively resolve this deeply
divisive question, would somehow create unity from discord by waving the
Constitution, the "rag of Right."
Wayne's espousal of this assumption, of course, had an institutionally
self-serving aspect. But he was not alone in this assumption. President
Buchanan had spoken to the same effect in his inaugural address, just two
days before the Supreme Court issued its decision. The status of slavery in
the territories, he said, was
... a judicial question which legitimately belongs to the Supreme
Court of the United States, before whom it is now pending, and
will, it is understood, be speedily and finally settled. To their
decision, in common with all good citizens, I shall cheerfully submit,
whatever this may be .... 62
Buchanan's statement also had a self-serving quality, since it is likely that
he had advance knowledge of the Court's intended disposition of the case
and was quite cheerful as a personal matter in exhorting submission to it.63
But Buchanan also had distinguished company in his avowal that the issue
of territorial slavery "legitimately belongs" to the Court. This was also the
considered judgment of the Congress-a judgment that had been recently
embodied in legislation. Indeed, the proposition that this issue should be
authoritatively resolved by the Supreme Court was, after 1846, the only
position regarding territorial slavery that could find the concurrence of a
majority in Congress.
60. H. ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMs 277 (Modern Library ed. 1931).
61. 60 U.S. at 454-55.
62. J. Buchanan, Inaugural Address, in 6 A COM.U'ATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS
OF THE PRESMENTs 2962 (J.D. Richardson ed. 1903).
63. Mendelson, Dred Scott's Case-Reconsidered,, 38 MINN. L. REv 16, 24 n.36 (1953).
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1846 was the year the House of Representatives approved the Wilmot
Proviso, specifying that slavery would be prohibited from any territory
acquired from Mexico in the then-pending warfare. 64 The Proviso was not
accepted in the Senate, but its House approval nonetheless marked the first
significant repudiation in our national politics of the terms of the Missouri
Compromise of 1820, because the Proviso ignored the Compromise's geo-
graphic demarcation of slave and free territories.
After four years of legislative stalemate regarding both the admission of
new states and the organization of new territories, the Congress enacted a
series of measures collectively known as the Compromise of 1850.65 Two
new territories, Utah and New Mexico, were organized with no specific
provision made in either regarding slavery. Instead, the Congress seemingly
delegated regulatory authority to the new territorial legislatures; but, at the
same time, the Congress refused to decide what regulatory authority it could
constitutionally delegate. By an artfully drawn provision, the Congress said
only that the territorial legislative power "shall extend to all rightful subjects
of legislation consistent with the Constitution of the United States."66 Then,
in subsequent provisions, direct appeals were authorized on the slavery
question from the highest territorial court to the Supreme Court and juris-
dictional amounts were abolished in such appeals. 67
In 1854 Congress enacted the Kansas-Nebraska Act, explicity repealing
the Missouri Compromise and instead enacting as a general proposition the
evasive formula of 1850 regarding the slavery issue in the territories . 6 As
one Senator observed, the Congress had enacted a lawsuit, not a law.
6 9 It
had repealed the Missouri Compromise and had replaced it with an appeal
to the Supreme Court.
As it happened, Dred Scott's lawsuit, which found its way to the Supreme
Court in 1856, did not come by this congressionally prescribed route. Indeed,
the Supreme Court's invalidation of the Missouri Compromise in Dred Scott
was in a practical sense redundant, since the Congress had repealed that act
in 1854. But the issue was properly presented to the Court in. a technical
sense, since Scott claimed that rights had vested in him when that act was in
force. Furthermore, beyond technicalities, the political branches were pat-
ently asking the Court to answer questions about the constitutionality of the
Missouri Compromise that they were unable to resolve. As two of the
Justices explained fifteen years later, in retrospective reflections on the
Court's decision. to decide Dred Scott, "the Court would not fulfill public
expectation or discharge its duties by maintaining silence upon these ques-
tions."
70
64. POTTER, supra note 2, at 21-23.
65. Id. at 112-14.
66. The Texas and New Mexico Act, 9 Stat. 446 (1850); The Utah Act, 9 Stat. 453 (1850).
67. See supra note 66.
68. The Kansas-Nebraska Act, 10 Stat. 227 (1854).
69. Mendelson, supra note 63, at 20 n.21 (quoting Senator Corwin).
70. Id. at 27 n.53.
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The Court thus fatefully undertook to decide questions that neither their
contemporaries in Congress nor their antecedents in the Constitutional
Convention had been prepared to resolve. This fact alone should have given
some pause even to men supremely confident of their reasoning and rhetorical
powers. But though this cautionary impulse is relevant, it is an incomplete
basis for criticizing the Court's decision to decide. In retrospect, the Court's
action may appear hubristic and impolitic. But in prospect, the times seemed
desperate, communal peace seemed endangered, and the Constitution seemed
applicable for resolution of the social questions at issue. Here is the nub of
our contemporary problem in evaluating the Dred Scott case: The times
often seem desperate; communal peace is frequently at stake in hotly litigated
issues; the Constitution seems plausibly applicable to almost anything. What
then should the Court have done?
I believe the Court should have answered the underlying question pre-
sented to it by the Dred Scott case. But the specific answers provided by the
Court were wrong. I do not mean that the Court should necessarily have
given different answers to the questions regarding the constitutionality of
the Missouri Compromise or the citizenship status of blacks-though I do
believe that if the Court chose to answer these questions, they were obliged
to give different answers. More fundamentally, however, I believe the Court
answered the wrong questions in the case. To be sure, the Missouri Compro-
mise and citizenship-status questions were presented and they were important;
but they were not the central question posed by the case and they should
have been answered, if at all, only after the Court had understood and
answered the central question.
The central question was both obvious to all the Justices and misunder-
stood by them. The central question was whether the Union would remain
intact in the face of a deeply divisive national dispute. Put another, more
prosaic way, the litigants (and those disputants whom they also represented)
in effect asked whether, in view of the intense conflicts between them, it was
necessary or even possible for them to remain members of the same political
community. The Justices of course knew that this question hovered at the
edge of all the pleadings in the case. But they acted as if the question were
already settled-as if the continued existence of a political community was
an agreed premise among the parties not requiring and even unfit for any
questioning.
By assuming rather than deliberating the answer to this basic question,
the Justices may have thought they were resolving to continue the communal
relationship, to preserve the Union. But they were wrong in this. Because
they did not think about the necessary preconditions for a continued political
union between deeply antagonistic parties, the Court took steps that were
inconsistent with those preconditions. In saying this, I do not contend that
the Court could have saved the Union if it had acted differently; there is no
way to know this, and many reasons to think that disunion and warfare
were inevitable by 1857.71 I do contend that the Court's action favored
71. See POTTER, supra note 2, at 27-50 (discussing underlying causes of Civil War).
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disunion and warfare in principle, even though its action may have had
limited practical significance in bringing this result, and even though contrary
action by the Court might not have averted this result.
Stated abstractly, I believe that the Court decided the wrong questions
in Dred Scott, that the real question at issue was not understood by the
Court, and that the Court gave the wrong answer (as well as an unintended
answer) to this real question. The real question was whether the Union
should continue and the Court, without realizing it, answered that in principle
the Union should be dissolved.
Put thus baldly, these are paradoxical conclusions. The paradox may be
resolved, however-or at least become clearer-by comparing Dred Scott to
the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education. In my view,
Brown both addressed this central question and answered it correctly. To
demonstrate this, and to show how Brown both resembles and differs from
Dred Scott, is to identify what was right with one and wrong with the other.
III.
The two cases are almost a century apart. The first endorsed the
oppression of blacks while the second embraced their liberation. But in their
invocation of and justification for judicial authority there are significant
similarities between Dred Scott and Brown v. Board of Education.
The doctrinal basis for both decisions, first of all, has the same kind of
historical vulnerability. The Court was more honest in Brown than in Dred
Scott about admitting its inability to find support in the framers' original
intention. But even Brown stated only that the historical sources were "at
best .... inconclusive ' 72 without clearly acknowledging that at worst, those
sources contradicted the Court's ruling. The same Congress that approved
the fourteenth amendment, after all, established an explicitly segregated
school system for the District of Columbia. Segregated public education,
moreover, was established in many Northern states when the amendment
was adopted, though none of the framers or ratifiers suggested that the
amendment invalidated that practice. 73 (Indeed, in 1896 when the Supreme
Court upheld the "separate but equal" public accommodations law in Plessy
v. Ferguson, it relied on an 1850 Massachusetts decision, written by the
redoubtable Chief Justice Shaw, approving racially segregated public schools.) 74
The invocation of constitutional doctrine in Brown is thus at least as
vulnerable to historic refutation as Taney's reading of black-citizenship status
or congressional authority in the territories.
Both decisions can also be justified by a frequently invoked canon of
constitutional interpretation. But it is the same justification for both cases:
John Marshall's sweeping directive for judges to interpret the Constitution
72. 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
73. See LITVACK, supra note 11, at 113-152 (discussing racially "separate and unequal"
education in antebellum Northern states).
74. 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896) (citing Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. 198 (1850)).
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to facilitate its adaptation to changing times.7 5 The relevance of this justifi-
cation points to another shared similarity and vulnerability of the decisions:
that both rested on the judges' reading of the dominant moral conviction of
their time. For Dred Scott that morality spoke explicitly of property rights
and implicitly of popular disdain for blacks; for Brown, equality was the
spoken norm, while popular distaste for Southern white brutality toward
blacks was the unspoken message.
7 6
But though the Justices in both cases appealed to widely shared contem-
porary attitudes, and accordingly hoped for popular acquiescence, there was,
nonetheless, no clear evidence of this support where it might have been
expected-that is, among popularly elected officials. In both cases, numerous
state legislative enactments were clearly hostile to the Court's ruling and the
national government was stalemated, unable or unwilling to take any position
on the issue. Indeed, in both cases, the very fact of congressional stalemate
was construed by some as a justification for Court intervention. (Justice
Jackson thus observed during oral argument in Brown, "I suppose that
realistically the reason this case is here is that action couldn't be obtained
from Congress.' )77
But though congressional stalemate might ordinarily prompt considerable
judicial diffidence, there was one added similarity between Brown and Dred
Scott that pressed the Justices toward action: the threat of civil warfare
hanging over the litigated issues. None of the Justices in Brown were as open
in acknowledging their concerns on this score as was Justice Wayne in Dred
Scott. But there was surely equivalent concern for "the peace and harmony
of the country" and hope that this could be assured by "the settlement of
(the deeply divisive dispute) by judicial decision."
7 8
Finally, in both cases the judicial decision was met by a firestorm of
protest, an increased polarization of publicly expressed attitudes among the
disputants, and regional, popularly approved overt resistance to judicial
authority. 79 Here, however, the similarities between the two cases end. Dred
Scott was repudiated by constitutional amendment and is now universally
reviled; Brown was ultimately ratified by popular opinion and national
legislative support and is now almost universally praised as an exercise of
judicial authority. This ultimate difference may serve for some as an adequate
75. Marshall's dictum was the basis for Alexander Bickel's conclusion that if the fourteenth
amendment had been an ordinary statute, it could not be read to prohibit school segregation in
light of the circumstances surrounding its enactment, but that as a constitutional provision such
reading would be permissible. See Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation
Decision, 69 H~Av. L. REv. 1, 59, 62 (1955).
76. See G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA, THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DaMoc-
RAcY 44-49 (1944) (discussing Northern white attitudes toward blacks and Southern white racial
policies).
77. 22 U.S.L.W. 3161 (1953).
78. 60 U.S. at 454-55.
79. See POTTER, supra note 2, at 286, 294-95 (regarding Northern resistance to Dred Scott
and parallels with Brown); B. MUSE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE (1964) (regarding Southern
resistance to Brown).
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distinction between the two cases, but not for me. To claim the vindication
of history works well only in retrospect; it gives no guidance for action in
confronting an uncertain future.
There is, however, another difference between the two cases that I find
dispositive. In both cases, the Court saw itself addressing profoundly divided
disputants with apparently irreconcilable claims; in both cases, the Court
conceived its role as preserving a communal bond, a political union, between
these antagonists; but in Dred Scott the Court chose means toward this goal
that the Court in Brown pointedly rejected.
In Dred Scott the Court sought virtually to eliminate future occasions
for possible contentious interchange between the disputants regarding the
specific issue that divided them. Taney's opinion rigorously pursued this goal
in three specific ways: by denying any congressional authority over territorial
slavery, thus removing the issue from possible deliberation in the national
legislature; by denying such authority to the territorial legislatures on the
ground that they had only derivative powers from Congress, thus effectively
shutting off any local deliberative process until statehood status had already
been attained; and by closing off any possible access of blacks to federal
courts, where aspects of the territorial slavery issue at least might have been
publicly focussed in the litigative process. The Court thus defined the
territorial slavery issue as an exclusively "private" question, not only in its
insistence that public institutions were obliged unquestioningly to honor the
"private rights" of masters in their slave property but also, and more
fundamentally, in its ruling that no public issue was posed-that is, nothing
was properly the subject of public deliberation as such-regarding the status
of territorial slavery.
Beyond the three specific ways that it removed the territorial slavery
issue from the public agenda, the Court invoked a more general proposition
toward this same effect: that this issue should be authoritatively and finally
resolved by the Court itself. The Congress had invited the Court to assume
this role, to be sure; but an invitation is not necessarily a command
performance. The Court seized the opportunity purportedly to save the
Union. There may have been a practical miscalculation here by the Court;
its decision may in fact have done more to precipitate than to avert civil
war. But that is not the basis on which I find fault in the decision. As
decided, Dred Scott in principle did not and could not save the Union. This
is because the decision was inconsistent in democratic principle with a
continued political union, a continued communal relationship, between the
antagonists.
The Court purported to settle the antagonism by awarding total victory
to one side and, concomitantly, by inflicting total defeat on the other. The
only political relationship that can follow from this result is the relation of
victor and vanquished or, to put the matter in its then-current signification,
the relation of master and slave. Dred Scott thus did more than find
constitutional validation for the enslavement of blacks. For the sake of
argument, let us accept the proposition that this racist premise was enshrined
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in the Constitution, so that blacks were-as Taney said-not participants in
the federal union but merely the properly of some participants. Accept the
proposition, moreover, that the enslavement of blacks was not inconsistent-
as Taney argued-with the democratic principle of equality on which the
Union, the American political community, was founded. Even swallowing
these propositions, it cannot follow that democratic principles permit one
acknowledged member of the American polity to enslave another. But this
is the result embraced by the Supreme Court in Dred Scott-that the Northern
whites who opposed territorial slavery were effectively enslaved by their
defeat at the hands of Southern whites.
This is not to say, however, that a contrary decision by the Court could
have averted the enslavement of some whites by others. If the Court in Dred
Scott had approved congressional power to prohibit territorial slavery (or if
the Court had endorsed the theory, pressed earlier by antislavery lawyers,
that the Constitution itself forbade territorial slavery 0), then Southern whites
would have been effectively enslaved at the hands of their Northern white
brothers. The fact is that the Court in Dred Scott was confronted with a
dilemma-an intractable dilemma in democratic principle. When one group
(or even one person) cannot submit to the will of others without suffering
what it (or he) regards as an excessive and intolerable defeat, then that defeat
cannot be justified in democratic principle. 8'
Majority rule is insufficient justification for this defeat. The underlying
premise of majority rule is the equality of each voter, but if the election
results so totally defeat the interests of one voter as he sees it, then his future
as an equal member of the polity is in jeopardy.8 2 The mere fact that he had
been treated equally in the past is no justification for others to inflict this
future deprivation, this ineradicable inequality as he sees it, on him. The
fact that this one person (or group) construes defeat as intolerable enslave-
ment is, however, no justification for him (or it) to inflict enslaving defeat
on antagonists.
This is the dilemma in democratic principle. There is no principled way
out of it. There are only practical ways out-warfare in which defeat is
involuntarily imposed or a unilateral breaking of communal relations, an
involuntarily imposed secession from political union. In these fundamental
and diametrically opposed disputes, the only way out consistent with the
democratic principle of political equality among members of the same polity
is if the antagonists change the terms of their dispute-if, for example, they
can find some mutually agreed compromise; or one side can be persuaded
to redefine defeat as acceptable, because on reflection it seems only a
temporary and ultimately recoupable setback; or because the losing side
80. W. WECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSmTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-
1848, 209-13 (1977).
81. I develop this proposition in Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the
Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455, 455-57, 483-85 (1984).
82. See id. at 455 n.l (regarding equality and majority rule).
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becomes convinced that its adversaries' defeat would be even more devastat-
ing and therefore less justifiable than its own loss.
There are of course many kinds of persuasion. A threat of force is one
kind; a demand for obedience based on a claim of unquestionably superior
worth or status is another. But neither of these persuasive techniques rests
on the democratic premise of mutually acknowledged equality. The only
technique that qualifies on this score is an appeal to reason. This is not to
invoke reason as narrowly conceived, cool rationality, but reason as a
mutually engaged deliberative process in which appeals to powerfully felt
emotions-fears, needs, angers, loyalties-play important parts: reason as
public conversation. The acknowledged goal of this reasoning process must
be persuasion based on respect for mutual equality-a process that must
(paradoxically) acknowledge that the very definition of mutual equality is
itself a properly disputable subject, even the most basic and most disputable
subject, of public conversation.
83
Dred Scott fails on this score. It was an attempt to shut off public
conversation which would thereby irrevocably break the bonds of commun-
ally acknowledged equal status among disputants-bonds that were already
stretched thin by their intensely felt, diametric opposition. On this score,
Brown v. Board of Education succeeds. Its success was not inevitable as a
practical matter, since mutually respectful public conversation among the
adversaries was not the immediate or perhaps even the most foreseeable
result of the decision.Y4 Brown was a success in principle. The Court
committed itself to facilitating a process of public conversation, of mutually
respectful dialogic engagement, between the adversaries. It thereby avoided
the error in principle committed by Dred Scott.
Brown presented the Court with the same dilemma of principle as Dred
Scott: the disputants were making intensely felt, mutually inconsistent de-
mands, so that victory for one was construed as intolerable defeat for the
other."3 In Brown, however, the defeat had already been inflicted on blacks
by the institution of race segregation, whereas in Dred Scott, neither disputant
had yet prevailed in the legislature regarding the status of territorial slavery.
Thus, in Dred Scott, the Court wrongly undertook to settle a dispute that
still raged unresolved among the antagonists, whereas in Brown, the Court
rightly acted to unsettle a legislative resolution that one disputant found
intolerable. This unsettling was all that the Court in fact did in Brown.
The Court invalidated segregation laws because, as it correctly observed,
these laws violated the democratic principle of equality by inflicting a
permanently subordinate status on blacks (marking them, in effect, as
83. Id. at 486-89.
84. MusE, supra note 79; cf. MYDAL, supra note 76, at 1011-15 (Gunnar Myrdal's
ominous forebodings ten years before Brown).
85. This was the basis for Herbert Wechsler's famous critique of Brown as unjustified
because no "neutral principle" transcended the opposed parties' positions. Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principle of Constitutional Law, 73 HAgv. L. Rv. 1, 34 (1959). For a critique of this
view, see Burt, supra note 81, at 463-64, 483.
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"permanent losers" in any disputes with whites). But though the Court ruled
in principle that blacks and whites were equal, it did not specify the precise
meaning of that equality. The Court did not dictate a new resolution for the
disputants; by reopening the controversy, it forced the disputants into a
process of sustained, direct public confrontation in forging a new resolution.
This was the underlying meaning of Brown 11,86 where the Court refused
to specify what would constitute an ultimately appropriate resolution of the
race segregation dispute and instead remanded this issue for further proceed-
ings in the various federal district courts. The practical effect of this remand
was to create visible, orderly public forums where black and white disputants
could confront and debate one another on the basis of an underlying premise
of equality. Because of blacks' rigorous exclusion from political participation
in the South, there was no other such public forum locally or nationally
available in 19558 Thus, unlike Dred Scott, which cut off all available
forums for public conversation, Brown created such forums where there had
been none.
This same underlying meaning-that the Court would not dictate a
resolution to the race segregation dispute but would force the antagonists
into direct, sustained public contact to forge their own-was even more
evident in the Court's effectively prolonged silence for more than a decade
following Brown 11.88 During this time the Court broke its silence only to
reiterate that Southern whites could not properly resist any public contact
with blacks, any possibility of ever acknowledging that blacks and whites
equally were members of the same political community. This was the meaning
of the Court's response to the "massive resistance" invoked by Governor
Faubus of Arkansas 89 and to the specific resistance employed by Prince
Edward County, Virginia, in closing its public schools altogether rather than
accepting the prospect of any racial integration. 90 But throughout this time,
the Court did not say what specific resolution of the race segregation
controversy would constitute an adequate acknowledgment of equal com-
munal membership between blacks and whites-for example, whether race
integration "in fact" was required or race segregation "by voluntary choice"
was permitted and how soon all of these issues must be settled.
The Court spoke to these specifics for the first time in 1968, announcing
an end to this tolerance for delay in eliminating "root and branch" all
aspects of racially separate public schools. 91 But by 1968 the national political
institutions had offered a new answer to the underlying question that the
Court had confronted in 1955-whether whites were prepared to acknowledge
blacks as equal members of the same community. The answer was provided
86. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
87. See MYRDAL, supra note 76, at 474-490 (describing Southern practices excluding blacks
from political participation).
88. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONsTITUTIONAL LAW 765-66 (10th ed. 1980).
89. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
90. Griffen v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
91. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
[Vol. 42:1
DRED SCOTT AND BROWN: A COLLOQUIUM
in the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 1965 and 1968, the passage of each of
which required the extraordinary (and, before 1964, unprecedented) amassing
of a two-thirds vote in the Senate to override the Southern filibuster.9 2 By
these legislative acts, Northern whites embraced a communal bond, a political
union, with blacks that had not previously been so explicitly acknowledged,
or even truly believed, on either side. (This acknowledgment was perhaps
most direct in the enactment of the "fair housing" title of the 1968 Act,
which proscribed discriminatory practices more prevalent in the North than
in the South.) 93
The question originally posed by Brown had thereby been both broadened
and transformed: it no longer was simply whether Southern blacks and
whites were mutually prepared to acknowledge communal ties; it was now
also whether Southern whites would acknowledge continued political union
with the North explicitly conditioned on acceptance of the principle of equal
communal membership with blacks. The context and meaning of community
for Southern whites and blacks, and the ideal of equality in that community,
had thus been radically changed for the original antagonists in Brown.
The Supreme Court did not, and could not, force this transforming
action by Northern whites. It could and did force the issue into stark visibility
in national public forums, so that Northern whites could not avoid some
explicit action, some response to the question posed by the Court. Now
armed with the Northern response in 1968, the Court spoke again to Southern
whites-but this time with a more pointed specificity: "Are you now prepared
to acknowledge a mutual communal relation with blacks?" This question
had been symbolically transformed, moreover, by more than the congres-
sional acts; the Court itself had been changed from the time Brown was
decided. Thurgood Marshall was then, in 1954, the principal advocate for,
as well as a member of, the excluded minority; now, in 1968, he sat as a
Justice of the Court.
9 4
But Southern whites might still have refused an affirmative answer to
the Court's question. If they had done so, the original dilemma of Brown
would have remained unresolved: the dilemma of achieving a communal
bond based on mutually acknowledged equality between diametrically op-
posed anatagonists. This was the same dilemma, unresolvable as such, that
Taney's Court faced in 1857; but it had ignored the dilemma, sought to
override it by fiat. A hundred years later, the Court did at least implicitly
understand this as a dilemma and it implicitly shaped its response accordingly:
to highlight the dilemma as such for the antagonists rather than to obscure
it by purporting to award total victory to one of them; and to press them
92. Thus only seven Senators outside the South voted against closure when it was first
invoked in 1964. See Burt, supra note 81, at 485 n.97.
93. S. LuBELL, WmE AND BLACK: TEST OF A NATION 140-45 (rev. ed. 1966); Hauser,
Demographic Factors in the Integration of the Negro, 94 DAEDALUS 847, 850-53 (1965).
94. Justice Marshall was appointed to the Court in 1967; he had been appointed to the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit by President Kennedy in 1962 and had resigned in
1965 to become Solicitor General at President Johnson's appointment.
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toward finding some mutually acceptable escape from this dilemma.
But the Court in Brown and subsequent race segregation cases never
explicitly drew this lesson to explain its various actions and inactions. There
are of course many possible explanations for the Court's silence on this
score. One possibility is that the Justices did not conceive their careful course
as required (or perhaps even as justified) in principle, but instead saw
themselves forced into their adroit gymnastics by a regrettable though
unavoidable political reality. Whatever the explanation, the Court never
articulated a clearly principled rationale for its cautious, Delphic progression
following Brown I. Conflicting rationales were, however, at least hinted by
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson during oral argument in Brown, according
to Alexander Bickel's account:
[T]he perceptive listener.. .would have heard Mr. Justice Frankfurter
probe the enforcement problem, worry about the possible gerryman-
dering of school districts that were supposedly not constituted on
racial lines, and finally say: "Nothing could be worse from my point
of view than for this Court to make an abstract declaration that
segregation is bad and then have it evaded by tricks." And the
listener would have noted persistent indications of Mr. Justice Jack-
son's feeling that the issue before the Court was better left to the
legislature, and that the ideal solution of it from the Court's point
of view would be to find a formula for making precisely a sort of
"abstract declaration" that would encourage Congress to deal with
the problem under the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 95
Just before his appointment to the Court, Frankfurter had written an
appreciative critique of Taney, ranking him "second only to Marshall" in
"intellectual power" and "enduring contribution" to constitutional theory,96
and characterizing his Dred Scott opinion as an unaccustomed lapse from
"judicial self-restraint. '" 97 The concerns Frankfurter expressed during oral
argument in Brown seemed to be an application of this critique. He was
eager to protect the public appearance of the Court's potency while his
underlying conception of its proper role, as a final authoritative dispute
resolver, was essentially similar to Taney's. 9s Immediately before his Court
appointment, Jackson had also written about Taney and Dred Scott; his
critique also seemed to lie beneath his expressed concerns about Brown:
The vice of judicial supremacy.. .has been its progressive closing of
the avenues to peaceful and democratic conciliation of our social
and economic conflicts....
95. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 6 (1978).
96. F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 72-
73 (1937).
97. Id. at 67, 72.
98. Compare Justice Frankfurter's statement, dissenting in the reapportionment case:
Disregard of inherent limits in the effective exercise of the Court's "judicial Power"
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[I]n the Dred Scott case.. .the Missouri Compromise itself had ceased
to be important. But there was still hope that American forbearance
and statesmanship would prove equal to finding some compromise
between the angry forces that were being aroused by the slave issue.
That hope vanished when the Supreme Court held that the Consti-
tution would allow no compromise about the existence of slavery in
the territories. 99
[11n the Dred Scott case...the Missouri Compromise itself had ceased
to be important. But there was still hope that American forbearance
and statesmanship would prove equal to finding some compromise
between the angry forces that were being aroused by the slave issue.
That hope vanished when the Supreme Court held that the Consti-
tution would allow no compromise about the existence of slavery in
the territories. 99
The implicit tension between Justices Frankfurter and Jackson was never
made explicit in the Court's opinions in Brown; a coherent justification for
Brown II, and an adequate distinction between Brown and Dred Scott, was
never explicitly formulated. By 1968 the Court was not only prepared to
abandon the "deliberate speed" formula of Brown II, but some Justices at
least seemed ready to repudiate that entire enterprise. Justice Black thus
indicated, in a 1968 television interview, that the Court had been wrong both
as a matter of political judgment and of principle by tolerating delay in
Brown II.100 He suggested that Southern whites would have more readily
complied with an adamantly stated, authoritative judicial order in 1955.
Black's retrospective political judgment may be correct; the practical basis
for Frankfurter's counsel of judicial self-restraint thus may not find support
in retrospect. But if, as a matter of practical politics, we are prepared to say
that the Supreme Court should have acted in Brown as the Court acted in
Dred Scott, then we are left with the task of distinguishing these two decisions
in principle. Perhaps there is some better basis than I have found. But in
any event, as Justice Jackson observed about Dred Scott, "[o]ne such
precedent is enough!"' 0'
not only presages the futility of judicial intervention.... It may well impair the Court's
position as the ultimate organ of "the supreme Law of the Land" in that vast range
of legal problems, often strongly entangled in popular feeling, on which this Court
must pronounce. The Court's authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the
sword-ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction. Such
feelings must be nourished by the Court's complete detachment, in fact and in
appearance, from political entanglements and by abstention from injecting itself into
the clash of political forces in political settlements.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
99. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 321, 327.
100. Black Believes Warren Phrase Slowed Integration, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1968, at 1,
col. 2.
101. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 327.
1985]

